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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002F
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-601
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
qmw
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002G
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8002
ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : __
FAILS T0_SW;TCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY-THE_WORST CASE FUNCT_O'N W_S _ALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002H
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] IN] [N]
C ] *
CX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-603
APPENDIX C
ASSESS_NTWORKSHEET
In
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002I
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002J
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
V--
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
u
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-605
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WO_SHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
AssEsS_NT ID: COMTRK-8002K
NASA FMEA #: _
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
1.2.8
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W. C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ _]_
NEW[X]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
J
m
U
m
U
i
u
=_
u
U
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE - [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CO_-8002L
1.2.9
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W. C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-607
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
g
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ASSESSMENT DATE: _/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002M
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10
NASA DATA: i_'_:_:::_ _;
BASELINE [ ]_ _
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN Loss OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002N
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-609
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESS_NTID: COMTRK-80020
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ _
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
D
m
z
l
m
I
m
Q
q
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002P
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002Q
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TEi
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002R
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
h
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002S
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16
_NKSADATA:
BASELINE[ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACE
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[2/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
B
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002T
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
n
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-615
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET m
U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002U
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.19
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
z
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m
mm
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I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TOSWITCHRESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002V
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
L
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ . ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO P_FORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES _SULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE _D CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-618
DATE: ASSESSMENT
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
-- MDAC ID:
ITEM:
_ LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
w
w
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
3/o5/88
COMTRK-8003A
1.2.18
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-619
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003B
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.21
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
g
ms
ms
b
m
m
i
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV _CTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTVREDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-620
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003C
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-621
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
W
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003D
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] [P] Cp]
C N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003E
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003F
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ].....
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN=_SS OF CCTVAND MISSION. Loss OF
ALLCAPABILIT_YTOPERFORMCCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSS!BLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW_ UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW vIsuAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003G
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
CO.ARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003H
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ............
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003I
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003J
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK .... i_
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N fN ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITYTO PERFORM CCTVFUNCTION COULD PREVENT_S STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003K
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003L
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003M
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003N
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8003
ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P] [ ]*
[p] [p] [p] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV_CY EXIST_VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80030
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3105/88
ASSESSME_ID: COMTRK-8003P
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT_CIRCUIT COULD RESULT_IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY bOOR CLOSe. WORST CAS_ CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CO_RK-8003Q
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.14
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
[ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003R
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRI TI CALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [p] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
mm
g
I
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m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY _QR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003S
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3105188
AssESS_NT ID: COMTRK-8003T
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
NASA DATA:
BAB_Iq_E _ [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] E ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003U
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
T._AD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003V
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.20
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
I
I
mm
I
g
g
g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004
NASA FMEA #: I.i.I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004A
NASA FMEA #: 1.i.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004B
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.
ix]
[ ]
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004C
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.11.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
CIL
ITEM
ix]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.
[x]
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i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004D
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST : W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.
ix]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004E
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.19
NASA DATA:
BAS_ [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......................
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004F
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [p]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ONLY THE WORST CASE
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004G
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.9
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ 3
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
m
mm
__---
ram
u
m
u
m
u
u
U
m
m
mm
m
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-648 B
m
wm
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004H
NASA FMEA #: i.i.i0
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMTRK-8004I
i.i. Ii.i
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
NASA DATA: ............
BASELINE [ ] _
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004J
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.12.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMTRK-8004K
1.1.12.2
COMMAND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
P] [P ] [ P ] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If appiicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004L
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004M
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT'.
1.1.17
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X _]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
g
B
m
l
mm
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004N
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.18
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA_ .........
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ONLY THE WORST CASE
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80040
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
i
m
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mm
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8004P
1.1.23.1
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004Q
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
m
m
B
I
am
I
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ONLY THE WORST CASE
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004R
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004S
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ONLY THE WORST CASE
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004T
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C 1
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004U
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.6
NASA DATA:
-BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004V
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004W
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8004
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004Y
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.20
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004Z
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
m
u
M
g
J
I
m
J
J
w
j
m
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-666
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004AA
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ONLY THE WORST CASE
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ASSESSMENTDATE:3/os/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004BB
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8004
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _..............
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005
NASA FMEA #: i.I.I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005A
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8005B
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8005
REMOTECONTROLUNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005C
NASA FMEA #: 1'1.11.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005D
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.15
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005E
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.
g
D
m
J
i
i
_I
mm
m
m
R
I
mm
m
l
m
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-674
J
m
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005F
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.8
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ _ [ _ [ X _ *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005G
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
U
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005H
NASA FMEA #: i.i. I0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
CP] Cp] Cp]
C N ] C N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005I
NASA FMEA #: i.i.ii.i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSSOF=OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005J
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.12.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT_: _ COMTRK-8005K
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.12.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005L
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
i
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-681
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005M
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMTRK-8005N
1.1.18
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] [ P ]
CP] [p]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80050
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005P
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005Q
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.2
NASA DATA:
BAS EL I_-E [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8005
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /1R ] i ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CP] [P] [P]
[P] [p] [p]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORTCIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OFf
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005R
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005S
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
u
I
I
mm
I
m
mm
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005T
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005U
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SNORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005V
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005W
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005Y
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-693
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWO_SHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005Z
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYST_:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM_D TRACK _
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_KS :
INTE_AL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORTC;RCUITCOULDRESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COORS ALL RCU
_CTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE _NCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005AA
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8005
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005BB BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8005
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ i_
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006A
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 313 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:(If=applicable) ...............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006B
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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J
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
C0_-8006C
3.1.3.2
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
W. C. LONG
RED_D_CY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS 0F-OUTPUTWORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006D
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006E
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006F
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TVCAMERA (FLT DECK)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
m
__4
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
C0_-8006G
3.2.2
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006H
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM"
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8006I
3.2.3.2
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
im
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006J
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006K
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006L
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006M
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK).
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] ,
[ ]
[ ]
i
g
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m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ . ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
COMTRK-8006N
3.2.3.1
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] C ] C ]
C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80060
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006P
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006Q
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8006
TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007A
NASA FMEA #: 3,1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN*AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007B
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007C
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS".
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILU_MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007D
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007E
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
B
m
I
I
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
COMTRK-8007F
3.2.1
COMMAND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
C ] C ] C ] C
[ ] C ] C ] [
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007G
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007H
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007I
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
B_SELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmc A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007J
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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me
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007K
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] C ] C ] C ] *
] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007L
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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n
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007M
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007N
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80070
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .........
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
C0_-8007P
3.3.4
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007Q
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8007
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
C ] C ] C ] C ] *
[ ] C ] C ] C ]
[ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ ] ix]*
[P] [x]
[N] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
g
l
i
mmm
t
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND •
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, ........
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ X] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD2DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008C
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RE SUL T IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL ....
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, _ i
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008D
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
=
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008E
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
B
R
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008F
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-739
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008G
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS •
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008H
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] CP] CP]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008I
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS". (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008J
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
AssEsSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008K
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
CP] CP] CP]
CN] CN] CN]
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008L
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008M
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4
NASA DATA: I
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008N
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80080
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] [P] CP]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008P
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8008Q
2.3.3.2
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C -
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
CO.ARE [ /N ] C N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009C
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL _ _
CAPABILIT_'T0 PERFORM CCTV _CTION COULD P_T RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009D
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
w
w
w
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-755
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009E
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RM& JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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i
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009F
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009G
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /iR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] CP] CP]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW&a2160HVI_RECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009H
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009I
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND mS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009J
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DA_E:L 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009K
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD P_q_T RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009L
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] CP] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009M
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[x] *
IX]
[ ]
I
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4560V
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
INADEQUATE [x]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS,
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
ONLY THE WORST CASE
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009N
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[2/2 ] [ ]
[2/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[x]*
Cx] _
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
REMARKS :
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
ONLY THE WORST CASE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80090
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.2
NASA DATA: ........
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _ _ ....
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C ] C ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
l
E
I
g
i
I
N
J
m
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-766--
mm i
m
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009P
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FUNCT_OS_.OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009Q
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.2
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
ONLY THE WORST CASE
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1_2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W. C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] CN] IN]
[X] *
[x]
[ ]
fromRECOMMENDATIONS: (If different NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, "
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CO_-8010B
2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010C
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA: _ _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
W
I
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mi
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010D
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010E
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM"
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
•(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010F
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CiL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010G
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _i_......._
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010H
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010I
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] CP]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[X] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/IR ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_SS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. -_ss OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010J
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010K
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
m
z
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010L
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010M
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ...........
[p] EP] [P]
[p] [p] [p]
C ] C ] C ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010N
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80100
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010P
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
z
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010Q
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CO_-8011A
2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W. C • LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] [N]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT TD:: COMTRK-80iiC
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
z
ms
[]
J
m
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m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011D
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ID:ASSESSMENT - CO_RK-8011E
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ }_
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: 8011
ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC AB C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011F
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]
C N ] C N ] [ N ]
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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AssESS_NT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011G
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV _CTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011H
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011I
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IoA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
U
nm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO P-_FORM CCTV _ COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIB_ _SS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011J
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
C x] *
IX]
[ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING3816R_NSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESS_NT ID: COMTRK-8OIIK
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011L
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
u
l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011M
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
2.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011N
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMTRK-80110
2.1.3.2
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C "
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011P
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] {
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
ONLY THE WORST CASE
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mm
ASSESSMENT_DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011Q
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.2
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
CADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012A
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.2
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8012
ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FL!GHT
HDW/nmC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C .......
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE_"
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. _:
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012B
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[x] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
AssESSMENT ID: CO_RK-8012C
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.5
NASA DATA: _
BASELI_ [ ........]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
C ] [x]*
[P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC QUTPUTRESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL F_CTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012D
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012E
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8o12
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] [N] IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC ouTPuT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012F
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012G
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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w
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012H
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: C0_-8012I
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012J
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012K
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012L
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CO_-8012M
5.2.4
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012N
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
[x]
[ ]
E
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I
D
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT iqS_ C_MTRK'80120
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
FUNCTION ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012P
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
FUNCTION ANALYSED.
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W
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012Q
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8012
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
FUNCTION ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CO_-8013A
NASA _EA #: 4.1.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
T_AD ANALYST: W.C. _NG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY RED_DANCY SC_ENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
N_A [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m
m
ml
mm
ml
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_SS=OF=_C oUTOUTCOULDRESULT IN_DUCEDMISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW _C NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL F_CTIONS AND _IST _C
PROVIDES P_TIAL _D_DANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. _LI_
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPE_ION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFO_ ELBOW _C _NCTION
COULD RESULT IN _SS OF MISSION.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013B
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013C
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 J [ J [ ] [ ] [ X J *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF _C 0UTOUT _OUL_ RESULT IN _DUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND _iST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013D
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
L
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ms
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013E
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013F
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
z
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013G
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
m.
mm
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
Loss OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND_COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013H
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-831
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
m
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: _ COMTRK-8013I
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.5
NAS_ DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] [ ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVCOUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDU_EDMISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USEDTOMONITOR CRITI_L FUNCTIONS _NDWRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
CONSIDERED A FACTOR DURING RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013J
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
CONSIDERED A FACTOR DURING RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013K
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
CONSIDERED A FACTOR DURING RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013L
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE FACTOR DURING
RMS STOW. PTU STILL FUNCTIONING TO MOVE TVC INTO STOW POSITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013M
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE FACTOR DURING
RMS STOW. PTU STILL FUNCTIONING TO MOVE TVC INTO STOW POSITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013N
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE FACTOR DURING
RMS STOW. PTU STILL FUNCTIONING TO MOVE TVC INTO STOW POSITION.
r
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80130
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013P
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013Q
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8013
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
C
C ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
C /
(If different from NASA)
] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
ONLY THE WORST CASE
m
m
z
u
m
m
m
m
I
mm
g
m
g
m
z
D
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-840
D
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C P ] C P ] [ P ]
[N] IN] IN]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE ANDCREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDU/¢DANCYEXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
w
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P-] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOORCLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ]. [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014D
NASA FME #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK ....
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] CP] CP]
IN] IN] [N]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]. [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL _TENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTVREDUNDANCY EXISTS V!A CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8OI4F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CO-MTRK-8014G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
B_ELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
COMM AND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8OISA
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK .....
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-851
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R
u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK .....
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSe. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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I
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IDA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.....ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
CAD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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m
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK ....<.....
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKECCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FORCREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
C0_-8015H
2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMM AND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTVAND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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m
m|
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA ]_TA:
COMTRK-8015I BASELINE [ ]
2.4.4.1 NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
E
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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D
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION, LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTVFUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDU_NDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] IN]
[X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
-- INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
-- RRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FORCREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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r_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMSJETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT. UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
w
W
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-863
APPENDIX C
ASSESS_NTWORKSHEET
w
J
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA: ......
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _:_
8016
PANAND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
E ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-865
APPENDIX C
ASSESS_NT WORKSHEET _-_-_U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW vIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-867
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT _: C0_-8017A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA: .......
_ASELI_NE [ ]
 w[x]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
J
g
i
mm
g
U
mm
g
U
U
N
g
g
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-868
m
r_
w
w
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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g
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8017
• PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN _SSOF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT MS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
V_ICLEAND C_W_ _LIKE CCTV_D_D_CY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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mmm
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
CP] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN Loss OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
oF-CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,_EVAAND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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lure
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
__ELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. _UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW vIEWING, EVA _D_ coAS-_FOR -_CR_ VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] CP]
[x] *
[ x ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
U
m
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mm
RECOMMENDATIONS". (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE4392H[]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018C
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
CN] CN] CN]
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTVAND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018D
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018E
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018F
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018G
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. -
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE _D CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018H
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018I
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM-.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
m
w
mm
i
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P _] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
AssEssMENT ID: COMTRK-8019A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
E_TIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATIONCOULDRESULT IN LOSSOF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
[N] [N] [N]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID" COMTRK-8019C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.i
NASA DATA:
.....BASELINE [ ] ....._ _
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
Q
i
i
u
m
N
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITT_T OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA 6R_ WINDOW VIEWIN_ _EVA _COAS_0R cREW _SUA_ !
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[p] [p] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESS_T ID: : CO_RK-8019E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA." ...........
BASEL_ [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG :_
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : ............... _
_TIC/iNTE_TTANT OPERATI0_--- COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VZA CREW %rfND_W VIEWING, EVA KND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WO_SHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
COMTRK-8019F
2.4.2.2
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W. C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[x]
[ ]
r
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSES_TENT ID: _0MTRK-8019G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA: _
........._ELINE _ [ .....] _ ....
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONTTORIHG P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES _SU_LTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREWJ UNLIKE CC_ REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VI_ C_ WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND C_FO_ CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[p] [p] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID_ ....._-8020A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
NASA DATA:
; _ASELINE [ _ ]
NEW [ X ]
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABIL_ITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-895
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3995/SS
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA: ......._ ...
_ BA_SSELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK ......
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXIS_VIA _W WI_D0W_VIE_NG, EV__C0AS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
u
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA : _ -
BASEL_E [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFOI_4_CTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT I'D: _OMTRK-8020G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8020
ITEM:
NA$A DAT_:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:3m/05/SS
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021
NASA FMEA #: 2'1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM"
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT iD: COMTRK-8021A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
COMMAND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFO_RMC_=_CTIONCOULD RESULT MS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY _OR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMEIT_ ID: CDMTRK-8021C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
SUBSYSTEM. •
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
NAS A DATA:_
B_SELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
_ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] [P] [p] IX]
[N] [N] [N] [ ]
z
mm
I
B
l
I
I
l
RE COMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMTRK-8021D
2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X ] *
IX]
[ ]
i
=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVAAND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISONTO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
L_
i
E
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-905
r _
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORESHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
N_A DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
T._.AD ANALYST: W.C. _NG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMP_ [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
_SS 0?_LL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ccTV_NcT-ION--COULD RESULT I_S
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
_SS QF_VEHICLE AND C RE_ UNLI_CC_DUNDANCy ............. _
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIE_NG, EVA AND COA S FOR CREW VISUA_
iNSPECT-ION_b RMS JETTISON TO AL_W P/L BAY DOOR C_S_. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] C P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If dlffer-ent from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021H
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021I
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
I
I
I
B
I
I
M
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.
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wAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESS_NT ID: COMTRK-8022
NASA FMEA #: _ 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 12 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
cRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
N
mm
B
U
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-913
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET m[]
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DAT_: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-915
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM'.
COMMAND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
U
m
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l
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g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMMAND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMMAND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY _SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CN] IN] IN]
IX] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PH-YSiCA-L BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS O_CCTV AND MISSION. _SS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHIC_DCREW_ UNLIKE CCTVREDUNDANCy .....
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA: _ _?_ _ _:
BASELINE [ ] _
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK ._ _ ._ _.
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
tit
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF AL_L_CAPABILITY TO PERFbRM-C-CTV FUNCTION COULD PREVEN T IRM_ STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK _
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[p] [P] [P] [x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF AL_ _CAP_%_tITY _TO PER_O_ Cd__d_iON C0ULD P_Ve_ _m_S stow
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS_VI_A_CREW WiNDO°W _VIEW_ING, EV__ _ COAti'FOR _CREW VISUAL i
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
SUBSYSTEM;
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMMAND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT W0_HEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
L_.AD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C _ _
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
L
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024C
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK !i_
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
g
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA: .......
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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T
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cc
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
cRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS -CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ccTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS_A CREW WINDOW_VIEWING_ EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JET_SONTO_ALLO_P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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m
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTVAND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERF0_ CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024H
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .....
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/IR ] [P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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i
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024I
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM-.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE_[ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
....FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _-
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[p] [p] [p] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMI_T OPE_TIQNC_LD_RESULT IN_S_FCCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /I R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-939
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWOPd_SHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] _
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORIN_P-/LB_AYDOORT__TCHESRESULTIN_LIN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREWWINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR Lq/)StrRE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CC_ AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION ANDRMS JETTISON TO ALIJOWP/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. -WORST
CASE CONDITION.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-941
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WQRKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BA_SELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY_TOPERFO_ CCTV_FUN_iON COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING •IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHIC_ANDCREW_ UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS F6R_CREWVISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
• INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS _ETTiSONTOALLOW P/L_BAY DOOR_LOSURE, .......WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:i _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK_ _ _
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENTs
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITT_T, OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PER_6_RM_6d_ _ION_COUtD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW, UNLIKE_ CCTV REDUNDANCY .........
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COA$ FQR CREW_SUA_
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8026
4.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8026
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDA/_Y SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
T_ OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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J
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8026A
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK i_
8026
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS 0FTVCOUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8026B
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8026
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT"
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR INRMS STOW.
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W
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8026C
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.2
NASA DATA: _- _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
COMM TRACKAND .............
8026
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE ..........
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWI--NG, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8026D
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8026
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
L
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESS_NT ID: COMTRK-8027
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK .....
8027
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PTUFAILURE TO MO_ RESULTS iN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
_DUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027A
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8027
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-951
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027B
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _ ....
8027
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ p ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
z
m
U
z
l
M
J
g
I
mm
g
mm
I
g
ix
g
g
w
g
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-952 _ ._
I
I
Lr
w
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8027C
4.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8027
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027D
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA. _ -_i_: :_::
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8027
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANcY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ p] [ P] [P] [x] *
[P] [P] [p] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS QF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTI_NESS. E_LBOWLTVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIALREDUNDANCY FOR MISS__ON SUPPORT. UNLIKE _'_
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA_D COAS FOR _EW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW. _
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027E
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8027
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
D
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8028
ITEM: PAN AND TILT _IT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m
I
mm
m
m
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL_DUNDANCY=FOR MISSION SUPPORT_UNLI_ ......
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREg_
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028A
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8028
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
=
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
L
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTOaT_: 3/0S/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028B
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASEL_ [ ]_
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
z
8028
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] IN]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS ViA CREW WINDOW $iEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL cAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028C
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8028
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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m
im
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028D
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] .
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK .....
8028
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
w.c. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO _ PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8029
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8029
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8029A
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE_[ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK _
8029
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8029B
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8029
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] _ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8030
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8030
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8031
3.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
COMM AND TRACK
8031
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CILCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8031A
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.3
, NASA DATA:
......._SELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8031
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
]
]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS 6-F-ouTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8031B
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8031
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
;= (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
....... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8032
NASA FMEA #: 3.6.6.2
NASA DATA: ___
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK _- _
8032
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8033
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8033
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. -
Lb_SS OF OUTPUT C6_D CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AhqYMISSION, LOSS OF ALL
CAPXB'ILI_ TO _ PERF_C_ FUNCTION Co[;LD-P_" P/4S_ S_AND ....
MONITORING: P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES REStrSTING IN POSSTBLE _LOSS OF -
VEHICLE _D CREW. UNLi_ _C_ REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW vIEWING, EVA ANDCOAS FOR _FISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8033A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8033
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] [N] [N]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8033B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8033
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C ] C ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] _ [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8034
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8034
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE_QFCCTV_D=MSSSIQ_.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTVREDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
w
i
I
I
I
I
I
im
ms
I
mi
i
_I
I
=mI
im
i
l
mm
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-972
I
I
L-
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8035
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAY)
COMM AND TRACK
8035
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION
WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8035A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAY)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _± _ _ _ _
8035
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS O? _OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY To PERFORM cc_ FUNCTION cOULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION
WAS ANALYSED.
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=
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8035B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAY )
COMMAND TRACK
8035
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ...... ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8036
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA: .......
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAY)
COMM AND TRACK .....
8036
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /2 ] [ IR] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION'
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTVFUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAST FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8037
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8037
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] CN] IN]
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS DF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS _FOR CREW VISU_INSPECTION ANDRMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8037A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK ......
8037
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
_AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OU_PU_ CouLD" cAUsE _sS _0F C'CTg_-AND _ MISSION' _ LOSS OFALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION Cb_I__Ng°RMSSTOW _
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE eCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING_ EvA _D=COAS_FOR _ _W_IS_L INSPEC_0_ AND _S
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST eASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8037B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8037
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_..... ADEQUATE [ X ]
......... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET .....
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8038
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
= ,
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8038
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x]*
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CC_ _cTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8039
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8039
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON
TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS
ANALYSED.
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J
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8039A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _ _ ..... :_
8039
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
_S$_oOF OUTPUT_ COULD _CAUSE _SS OF C_TV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS sToW _D_
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON
TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS
ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8039B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8039
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8040
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _: :......:_ _;_ _! _ _-
8040
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS _CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ___,_ _ __
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(if applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONCOULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8041
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8041
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CIL
L
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN REDUCED
MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. _IST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL
FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION
SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIS CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA
AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST
CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8041A
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.4
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8041
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]
[N] [N] IN]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
1
M
1
|
|
1
1
z
m
1
z
1
_l_
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN REDUCED
MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL
FUNCT!ONS_DELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION
SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIS CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA
AN_D COAS FOR CREW VISUAL IBS_ECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST
CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMTRK-8041B
5.1.6.3
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8041
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
ix]
[ ]
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8042
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.2
NAS_A_DATA: ......._z_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK i_±_ _ - _ _
8042
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_C
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C _
NASA
IOA
[2/2 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] IN] [N] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF MLA OUTPUT. LOSS OF
MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN REDUCED MISSION
EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION
SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA
AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST
CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
|
U
ms
m
a
ms
R
m
m
I
l
m
mm
z
mm
I
m
m
ms
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-988
m
M
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
m
n
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8043
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8043
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ix]
[ ]
LOSS OF TVC
ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS
ANALYSED.
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m
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8043A
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMM AND TRACK
8043
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L.BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION_NEFFECTIVENESS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
[ ]
LOSS OF TVC
ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS
ANALYSED. r
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
CO_-8043B
4.1.6.3
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8043
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C ] C ]
CP] [P]
CN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[x]
[ ]
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8044
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA: .......
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ ....
8044
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C _:_
NASA
IOA
[2/2 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [N] [N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045A
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]....
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
a
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMMAND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] i[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID" COMTRK-8045C
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.
i
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(ADD/DELETE)
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/0S/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045D
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA: ........
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COORS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESS_NT ID: COMTRK-8045E
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8045F
3.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045G
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.2
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045H
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
m
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: C O_MTRK-8045I
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.4
NASA DATA: _.-_.
-BASELINE [ _] ....
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
i
m
m
b
u
J
m
N
J
m
mm
m
mR
m
I
mm
mm
g
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-I002 _
g
B
m
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045J
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
i
q
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
AssEssME_ ID: COMTRK-8045K
NASA _A #: 4.3.8.2
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045L
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045M
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045N
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ix]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80450
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3
NASA DATA_ ......
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[x]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8046
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046A
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8046
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046B
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8046
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046C
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8046
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
J
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046D
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8046
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
cIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046E
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.8.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8046
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W. C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046F
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8046
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046G
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.7.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8046
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO_LLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK- 8047
2.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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E
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047A
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT AGREEMENT.
ix]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047C
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST : W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT AGREEMENT.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047D
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
COMMAND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047E
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047F
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
F
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m
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047G
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK _
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W. C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............................
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MQDE_ COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS. _
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047H
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047I
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
J
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE).
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047J
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
!
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.
[x]
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im
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047K
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] E ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
b
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] E ]
{ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047L
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
COMMAND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047M
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.4
NASA DATA: :_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]'
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047N
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
i [ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ix]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80470
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.7.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicab!e) ...........
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
RE_ARKS".
LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8048
WIDEANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
r_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] '[ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
r_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048A
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8048
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmc A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048B
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8048
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048C
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8048
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
C ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
C ] C ] C ] C ]
[ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048D
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8048
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
[ ] [ ][ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
=
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048E
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8048
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MiD DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
g
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
•(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048F
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8048
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048G
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8048
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8049
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8049
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w
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L_
W
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8049A
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8049
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
L
mm
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g
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8049B
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8049
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] C ] C
C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESS_NT ID: COMTRK-8049C
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8049
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8050
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8050
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8050A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8050
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
W
u
W
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8051
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8051
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8051A
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8051
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8051B
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8051
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8051C
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8051
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
E
I
m
I
B
mm
D
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
D
m
ms
m
i
U
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-i050 _ _
ms
|
M
mw
L
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8052
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8052
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8052A
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8052
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8053
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8053
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 211R]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8053A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8053
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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DAg;SSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8053B
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3
NASA
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8053
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DE_T_)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT
ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8053C
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8053
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
cOMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
Im
ms
i
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT
ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR C LOS_E. WORST CASE CONDITIONS.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8054
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8054
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
IX] *
[X]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOWAND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
!
w
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-I057
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8054A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
=
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _
8054
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/J_NG COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY To PERFO_ CC_ _NCTION COULD PREVENT'RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8055
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8055
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-I059
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
M
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8055A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8055
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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r
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8055B
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8055
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8055C
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8055
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IDA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[2/1R] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[p] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ N ] [N] [N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO P_ERF6RM CCTV FUNCTIbN_COULD PREVENT mS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
U
m
mm
m
I
m
l
mm
i
U
ms
z
I
m
U
B
mm
I
mm
i
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-I062 _ _ _ m
El
mn
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8056
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8056
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION.LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS
VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8056A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8056
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
l
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8057
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8057
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASECONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8057A
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
2.2.8.2
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8057
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COASFOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8058
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8058
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8058A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8058
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/J_INGCOULD CAUSE LOSS QF CCTV_ANDMISSIQN.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM_Ct_ FUNC_ C0ULD PR_ MS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE_ CCTV RE_D_DA_Y EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDO#VIEWING, EVA _D COAS F0R CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BaY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8059
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8059
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMTRK-8059A
2.2.6.4
COMM AND TRACK
8059
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
C
[ 3
[p]
[N3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ _i_
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P 3 [ P ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CC_ FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D
RMS JETTISON TO ALLow P/L BAY DOOR CLOS_E. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8059B
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8059
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTIoN AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8059C
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8059
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASADATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C L
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPU COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8060
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8060
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8060A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8060
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELET E )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING iN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNL_IKE_ CCTV _D_DAN_CY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8061
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
COMMAND TRACK
8061
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
......... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF CLA COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT
USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FuNcTIoNS _D ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL
REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW wINDo_vIEWiNG, EVA _b-COAS'F6R C_WgisuAiiNSP_Ti_N. _
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMTRK-8061A
5.2.6.4
DATK:
BASELINE [ ....]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _
8061
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF CLA COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT
USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL
REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR C_W VISUAL INSPECTION.
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMTRK-8061 B
5.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8061
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
FUNCTION ANALYSED.
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION.
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8061C
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.7.2
NASA DATA:
BA_SELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _ ...... _
8061
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST _C)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
FUNCTION ANALYSED.
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION.
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8062
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8062
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ P ]
REMARKS:
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8062A
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.7.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8062
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] [N] CN]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ P ]
REMARKS:
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8063
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8063
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF CLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ix]
[ ]
LOSS OF TVC
ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8063A
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8063
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C 1 _i 'ill
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS-. (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF CLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF Tvc 0UTPUT.
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF TVC
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8063B
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8063
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
n
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT
ANALYSED.
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESS_NT ID: COMTRK-8063C
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK .... _ < _
8063
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
NASA P_T_I
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
.. _!== =
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LQS_ QF 0UTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION _ LOSS OF SYNC NOT
ANALYSED.
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELB0WTVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8064
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8064
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8064A
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
....._SELINE [......] ....
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8064
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT|
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] [P]
CN] CN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/J_IN _G _E_L!_ IN_ _SS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
P_T!AL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUppORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND CO--AS FOR C_VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065A
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A _Y_ i_B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065B
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION.
IN AGREEMENT.
CRITICALITIES ARE
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CO_-8065C
3.2.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK ........
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
A B C "_
C ] C ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065D
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065E
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ _ *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065F
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION.
IN AGREEMENT.
CRITICALITIES ARE
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065G
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.2
NASA DATA:
_BASELINE [
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065H
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
z _z
M RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065I
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065J
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065K
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8O65
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065L
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
R
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3105188
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065M
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.8
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
COMMAND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
ASSESSMENT:
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065N
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
COMMAND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
w
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mm
M
R
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80650
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
i
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-II03
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT I]): COMTRK-8066A
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
i
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS-OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066B
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-II05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066C
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066D
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] C ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
i [ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-II07
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
me
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066E
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] C ] C ] [
C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
C0_-8066F
3.5.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[
[
[
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] [ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
l
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-II09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066G
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
[ 3/3 ]
[ 313 ]
[ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C /
(If different from NASA)
J
] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066H
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
z
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-Ill1
APPENDIX C :
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066I
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.4
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK :_ -_
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066J
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
g
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
COMTRK-8066K
3.5.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
C ] C ] C ] C ] *
[ ] C ] C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066L
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-II15
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
g
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSME_ ID: COMTRK-8066M
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066N
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-II17
APPENDIX C_
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET m
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3105188
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80660
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.10
NASA DATA: ,
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK ......
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
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u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067A
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
Loss OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067B
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY ....REDUNDANCY SCREENS elL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067C
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSE OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067D
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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g
g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067E
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POISING AND PICTURE
AD_S_ENTS DIFF_C_LT_IF_'NOT-IM-POSSIBLE RESULTING iN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067F
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067G
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.8
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CANBE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067H
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
z
=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMTRK-8067I
7.1.10
COMM AND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFIc-U-LT IF NOT IMPosSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067J
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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m
[]
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8067K
7.1.12
COMM AND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJU_ENTS _F-F!_LT IF NOT_I_OS_IBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067L
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067M
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
l
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS QF CM _D PRESENTSoWQRST CASE
C_DI_I6N_ _ON _TICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067N
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8067
CONSOLE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE
CONDITION. NON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO_S-gF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CMWOULD MAKE TVC PQINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068A
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
IN] [N] IN] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULTIF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068B
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
L95_ OF OUTPUT FROMBOTH CMWOULD MAKE TVC POIN_TING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF vEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS CO_LDPOTEN_IAL_PROVIDEA_S_ST_CE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068C
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068D
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.5
NASA DATA:_:_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
• (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FRQM BOTH CM WOULD MA_TVC ,_OINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
C0_-8068E
7.1.6
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-I139
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMTRK-8068F
7.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
C ]
CP]
[N]
W.C. LONG
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : ...................
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIF?ICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOa [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
C0_-8068G
7.1.8
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
W. C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
AssESS_NT ID: COMTRK-8068H
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RE COMMENDAT IONS. " (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH _ WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF-NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
cRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068I
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
- I
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8068J
7.1.11
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIF?ICULT-IF NOT_SSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068K
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [3/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068L
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.13
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ __ -
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068M
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE
CONDITION. NON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068N
NASA FMEA #: 7.1.15
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8068
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /!R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: r
LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN_SS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE
CONDITION. NON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8069
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8069
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS
OF MISSION. A SECOND GCIL REDUNDANCY FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CCTV. LOSS OF CCTV AND ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS
FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8070
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:z_
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8070
TV PWR CNTLUNIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL SHORT/OPEN COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION. A
SECOND GCIL REDUNDANCY FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8071
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8071
TV PWR CNTL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [ ]
[ ] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
i
[313
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
, (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD RESULT IN OPERATING IN PANEL OR CMD MODE
WHICH PRESENTS ONLY OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASS_SMENT ID: COMTRK-8072
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8072
TV PWR CNTL SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [ ]
[ ] [ N ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
i
[-3 13
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
AN OPEN SW WOULD REQUIRE THAT ALL CCTV FUNCTIONS BE SELECTED BY
THE CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8073
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8073
TV SYNC SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT CRITICAL.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8074
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8074
TV SYNC SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. OPEN/SHORT PRESENTS A CREDIBLE
FAILURE HWICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8075
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8075
TV DOWNLINK SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT CRITICAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESS_NT ID: COMTRK-8076
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8O76
TV DOWNLINK SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA: __
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERP_T NASA CCTV FMEA CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT CRITICAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8077
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
C ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8077
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8078
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8078
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN/SHORTCOULD RESULT IN L_SS OF _AND MiSSIg._,....S_eO_DS GCIL
CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
I
B
I
l
R
i
|
|
B
I
R
mm
m
[]
l
E
m
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-I158
B
J
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
w
w
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8079
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8079
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8080
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8080
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN/SHORT CQULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. SECOND GCIL
CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8081
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8081
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
w
w
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 CIlI61
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8082
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8082
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_c A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
RE_KS: ..............
OPEN/SHORT COULDRESULT IN LOSS OF TVCAND MISSION SECOND GCIL
CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8083
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8083
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CO_K-8084
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
COMMAND TRACK
8084
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
W.C. LONG
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF Tvc AND MISSION.
[ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
[ ]
[x]
SECOND GCIL
CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8085
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8085
TV CAMERA POWER SW_TCH (RMS TVCS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[p] [P] [P] ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT A CIL.
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF EITHER RMS WRIST OR ELBOW
TVC DEPENDING ON SWITCH POSITION. BOTH HAVE SAME CRITICALITY.
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Q
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8086
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20409-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK ......-_ _ -_: i:
8086
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (RMS TVCS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
i
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT IN REDUCEDMISSION
EFFECTIVENESS DUE TO LOSS OF RMS TVCs WHICH DO NOT MONITOR
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON. LOSS OF RMS
TVC'S COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8086A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20409-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8086
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (RMS TVCS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
%.--
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION
EFFECTIVENESS DUE TO LOSS OF RMS TVCs WHICH DO NOT MONITOR
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON. LOSS OF RMS
TVC'S COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8087
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA: .......
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8087
TV PWR SWITCH (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C _,_ ....
C ] C ] C ] [ ]*
C ] C ] C ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ J ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT .....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8088
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8088
TV PWR SWITCH (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
v
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8089
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
L
COMM AND TRACK
8089
TV PWR SWITCH (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[X]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8090
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8090
TV PWR SWITCH (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8091
NASA _EA #: 6.0.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA: i
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8091
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
W.C. LONG
[p] [p] Ix]*
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[2/1R2 [P2
[3/3] [ 3
IN] IN] IN]COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPEATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8091A
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8091
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CP] CP]
C ] C ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPEATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
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NO
ASSESSMENTDATE:3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8091B
NASA #: 6.0.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA: _ _:=:_
BASELIN_ [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8091
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH_INTAINS ELBOW OR _IST TVC OPEATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8091C
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8091
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPEATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CO_-8092
6.0.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _ _, _
8092
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICALOPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN _SS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8092A
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8092
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8092B
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8092
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[ ]
CO.ARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
E_CTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LO$$OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8092C
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8092
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
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mm
ASSESS_NT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8093
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK _ :
8093
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH _!NTAINS ELBOW Q_WRIST TVC OPE_TION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8093A
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8093
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8093B
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8093
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
]
]
]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
C0_-8093C
6.0.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8093
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
W.C. LONG
A
CIL
ITEM
[ ] [N]
B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CO_-8094
6.0.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8094
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHNICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8094A
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8094
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]
C ] C ] C ]
[x] *
[ ]
[N]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHNICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.
w
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1
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8094B
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.4
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK ....
8094
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
c /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN Loss 0?_MIS_0N. MECHNICAL INTERFERENCE D_iNG RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8094C
NASA FMEA #: 6.0.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8094
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHNICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8095
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK _ ....
8095
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8096
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM"
COMM AND TRACK
8096
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8097
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA: .........
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8097
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS_CTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8098
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8098
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8099
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA: -
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8099
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO:_OMP_BLE NASA CCTV _EA. FAILU_ TO =PROVIDE THIS _TION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMTRK-8100
COMM AND TRACK
8100
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
w
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8101
NASA FMEA #:
N_SA DATA_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8101
TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmc A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO COMP_BLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAIL_ TO PR0VI_ THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8102
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8102
TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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U
B
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8103
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8103
TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)_il _u_
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMP_BLENASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS• FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8104
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8104
TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8105
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8105
TV CAMERA PANTILT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] C ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8106
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8106
TV CAMERA PANTILT SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8107
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA D_ATA: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESS_NT:
COMM AND TRACK
8107
TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (PEAK)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
NO CQM2_IB_ NASA CCTV FMEA, NOT CRITICAL.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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